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‘A  paper  prepared  for  the  Group  of  24. This paper  offers  an assessment  of the interests of developing 
countries  in the proposal  to  create what is being referred  to as 
a short-term  financing  facility within the IMP.  (The label 
leaves  something  to be desired,  inasmuch as the more distinctive  .  . 
feature  of such a facility would probably be that it should be 
fast-disbursing  rather than that it lend on short maturities.) 
The paper  starts  by discussing  the purpose of such a facility, 
summarizes  the  sort of proposals  that have been advanced 
regarding  its mode  of operation,  and then turns to the main 
purpose  of the paper, which  is to evaluate pros and cons. 
Puroose  of the Prooosal 
Under  conditions  of high capital mobility, countries that receive 
capital  inflows  are vulnerable  to swings of sentiment  in the 
capital  markets.  If expectations  were always rational,  in the 
technical  sense  of being based upon the best possible  forecasts 
of fundamentals  using  available  information, and were  independent 
of the opinions  of other market participants,  then there would be 
no case for having  the official sector second-guess  the 
conclusions  of the market.  But to the extent that markets  are 
prone  to speculative  swings of mood  (the phenomenon that justifies  the guip that a country  is creditworthy as long as 
others  are lending to it), it may be useful to have an official 
presence  in the market.  Note that there is a convincing 
institutional  reason  that can explain why markets may behave in a 
herd manner  rather  than act on longer-term, rational 
considerations,  in that the managers  of mutual funds are rewarded 
on a quarterly  basis by comparison 
who missed  out on the Mexican  boom 
,  it,  while-he  would  not necessarily 
with their peers: a manager 
would have been penalized  for 
have suffered from the Mexican 
collapse  provided  that his peers were caught as well. 
One conception  of what a new facility should attempt to do 
is to provide  a backstop  to resist speculative pressures that are 
8 
not  justified  by the fundamentals.  However, it may be argued 
that this would  give  it an unnecessarily  broad brief, since the 
Fund's  existing  facilities  are capable of handling many of the 
cases  in which  capital moves  in what is judged to be a perverse 
direction.  If one asks under what situations the Fund's existing 
arrangements  are clearly  inadequate, it is to deal with those 
cases where  the need  is for action so immediate that the normal 
operations  of the F'und  could not be effective.  There are two, 
and only two, types  of situation where this holds:  (a) where a 
country  is trying  to defend an exchange rate peg; and  (b) where a 
country  is so illiquid  that without  international help it will 
have  no alternative  but to default.  In both of those situations 
help  has to be immediate  if it is to be of any Use at all. 
I 
2 Enthusiasts  for floating  exchange rates naturally  oppose the 
idea of giving  countries  extra help  in  defending pegged exchange 
rates.  It follows  that they would seek to restrict the scope of 
any new facility  to helping  indebted  "emergent borrowers". 
Others  seek to limit the scope of a new facility to countries 
which  pose  a sytemic  threat,  on the grounds that a case for 
international  action  canbe  justified only if there  is some type 
of international  spillover.  In practice this would tend to 
,restrict  the availability  of the facility to large countries. 
Hence  there  are a variety  of purposes that might be served 
by a new facility.  At the broadest  level, it might be charged 
with  helping  countries  to finance,  and therefore ride out, 
8 
capital  flows that were  judged to be unjustified  by the 
fundamentals  and therefore  destabilizing.  A more restricted 
mandate  would  limit  it'to occasions when immediate access was 
vital,  either  to defend  a pegged  exchange rate or to avoid a 
default.  A still more  restricted  mandate would preclude use of 
the  facility  to defend  an exchange rate peg.  A  further limit to 
the  mandate  would  involve restricting  access to countries whose 
default  was  judged  to pose a systemic threat.  Most of the 
discussion  that  follows  focuses on the broad version of the 
proposal. 
Given  that the IMF was conceived with the aim of providing  a 
lender  of last resort,  it is a natural candidate for the role of 
providing  a backstop  facility to deal with diseguilibrating 
capital  flow&.  Of course,  the original purpose of the IMF was to 
3 lend to cover deficits  in the current account, and Article VI 
specifically  precluded  lending to finance a capital outflow.  But 
this Article  has for long been something of a dead letter: at the 
very  least, many  of the current account deficits  for which the 
Fund has  lent have been amplified  by capital outflows  ("capital 
flight").  It is many years,  if indeed it ever occurred,  since 
the Fund exercised  the right given to it by Article VI, Section 
l(a)  I  to "request a member to exercise controls to prevent...use 
,  of the general  resources  of the Fund" to meet a large or 
sustained  outflow  of capital.  For some years now the Fund's 
policy  has rather  been to encourage  liberalization  of the capital 
as yell  as the current account. 
The Prooosal 
The  idea of creating  a short-term  facility to counter capital 
flows  judged to be speculative  and destabilizing  harks back to an 
idea that was discussed  during the Committee of Twenty.  It was 
revived  by Michel  Camdessus  in speeches last May and June.  Some 
tentative  proposals  were laid out in a paper presented  to the IMF 
Executive  Board  entitled  "Short-Term Financing Facility11  dated 26 
September  1994  (subsequently referred to as "the IMF papeP).  It 
is these proposals  that are summarized here.  They are presented 
under  five headings:  the countries  that should have access to 
such a facility,  the terms of access, the level of access, 
maturity,  and the source of finance for the facility. 
I 
4 The IMF paper  contains no explicit discussion  of which 
countries  would  have  access to the facility, but it is clearly 
addressed  to those member  countries that have a high leve.1  of 
involvement  in the international  capital market.  It appears to 
be addressed  to the broadest  conception of the purposes  of such a 
facility,  as discussed  above.  One can assume that the 49 
countries  listed  in Table  1 of the IMF paper are judged to be 
. 
potential  candidates.,for access to the facility.  These 49 
,  countries.comprise  22 industrial countries; 12 Latin American 
countries  (including all 7 of the large countries); Korea and the 
5 large ASEAN  countries;  Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco,  Tunisia, 
and Turkey;  Hungary  and Poland; and South Africa. 
t 
paper  explicitly  cites  it as a country that might 
a facility  had  it been available  in January 1993, 
Since the 
have used such 
it is 
surprising  that the Czech Republic  is not included in the list. 
Another  country  that  is not included but whose growing 
involvement  in 
it a candidate 
Since the 
\ 
the international  capital market might well make 
for access  is India. 
rationale  of creating a new facility is to give 
the Fund the capacity  to provide rapid access to funds that could 
be used to counter  speculative  disturbances, the terms of access 
are crucial.  The IMF paper proposed that a request for the right 
to borrow  under  the facility should  be made at the time of an 
Article  IV consultation.  The Board would approve the 
availability  of a line of credit for a specified period, perhaps 
6 months,  if'after  a comprehensive  review of the country's 
5 policies  it was determined  that  @l(i)  the member had a strong 
record  of economic  policies  and performance  and it was suggested 
that policies  would  remain appropriate;  and  (ii) the member  was 
judged not to have a fundamental balance of payments problem." 
The IMF paper  envisaged two possible procedures under which 
a drawing  might  be made under such a line of  credit.  The first 
would  give the country an automatic right to draw  (at least a 
first tranche),  with.an  immediate report to the Board but no need 
,  for Board.approval  of the drawing.  The second procedure would 
require  approval  at the time of the request for use of-the 
facility,  which  88would  be approved  if in the Fund's assessment: 
(i),the member's  balance of payments problem was short-term;  (ii) 
the member's  economic  policies had been appropriate  since the 
last Article  IV consultation;  and  (iii) the member was taking 
appropriate  measures  to address  its short-term balance of 
payments  difficulties.@'  The first approach would provide more 
confidence  to a member  that it would be able to use the facility 
should the need  arise and would  in that event permit immediate 
access to the facility,  and would therefore have more potential 
to reassure  the markets;  but it would expose the Fund to more 
risk.  Conversely,  the second approach would better protect the 
Fund, but at the cost of introducing uncertainty  and delay into 
the process  of approving  a drawing, especially when the Fund felt 
that  it was necessary  for the country to make a policy change 
before  a drawing  was appropriate. 
I 
6 The IMP paper  suggested that a country for which  such a line 
of credit had been approved might be expected to report regularly 
a handful  of key financial variables  to the Fund as long as the 
line of credit was available.  It declared that performance 
criteria  and phased  drawings would not be appropriate,  but 
suggested  that there might be a role for tranching  (i.e., that 
requests  for drawings  beyond a certain  level could trigger 
consultations  or a review of policies).  Periodic  consultations 
,  would  be expected  as long as credit was outstanding  under the 
facility. 
The IMF paper points out that the level of access would need 
to pe commensurate  with the size of reserve  losses that countries 
can sustain  over short periods  if the facility was to make a 
useful  contribution  to easing the problem of destabilizing 
capital  flows.  It explicitly  argues that it would be undesirable 
for the facility  to finance shocks fully, and it assumes that 
because  of Article  VI the facility  should not be used to finance 
a large or sustained  outflow of capital.  (If it had said "large 
and sustainedV8,  or just "sustained", this would have been 
unexceptionable,  but the whole purpose of the facility is to 
finance  large  outflows.  Indeed,  it is difficult to see how such 
a facility  can be reconciled  with the present wording  of Article 
VI.)  The paper  also argues that the facility should play a 
signalling/catalytic  role that would help to reduce the magnitude 
of the reserve  losses that would need to be financed--although 
the Mexican  experience  suggests that one should not take it for 
7 granted  that Fund programs will be successful in inducing a 
reflux  of private  capital.  After listing these imponderables, 
the IMF paper mentions  a possible access range between 100 and 
300 percent  of quota. 
That would  have given Mexico access to an IMF loan of a 
maximum  of $7.8 billion, the figure that the Fund initially 
_  volunteered.  That figure was subsequently supplemented by a 
further  $10 billion,.,in  an impressive display of the Fund's 
,  ability  to escape  from its customary constraints when it judges 
the case to be compelling  enough.  But even that total of $17.8 
billion  was  little over a third of the total package that Mexico 
was,judged  to need.  Thus the Mexican case would suggest that any 
useful  facility  will need to allow for the possibility of access 
on a substantially  larger scale than the Fund was anticipating 
last September.  Similarly,  300 percent of quota would be fairly 
modest  in comparison  to the exchange market presssures that 
developed  in the ERM during its 1992-93 crisis: the Bundesbank 
has stated  that DM 188 billion  (some $129 billion) was spent in 
defending  ERM parities  in the second half of 1992, a period 
during which  the 
Italy, Portugal, 
$23 billion  came 
sources  of funds 
Bundesbank. 
parities  of six countries  (Denmark, Ireland, 
Spain, and the UK) with total IMF quotas of some 
under attack.  There were, of course, other 
used  in intervention besides drawings on the 
The IMF paper proposed that the maturity  of the loans under 
the facility'would  be short.  A basic maturity  of three months 
8 was  suggested,  with the possibility  of rolling over for a further 
three months.  Of course,  it was recognized that a problem might 
turn  out to be less transitory  than had originally been 
anticipated:  the IMF paper suggested  that this could be met by 
funding  via a standby  or extended arrangement.  (However, it  was 
emphasized  that the facility should not be used to provide 
bridging  finance where the need for longer term financing was 
apparent  from the outset.) 
Once+again,  the experience with Mexico must make one doubt 
whether  such a short-term  facility would meet the need.  What 
Mexico  needed  was the ability to fund a large volume of short- 
te?  into medium-term  debt, which required at least the 
possibility  of medium-term  support. 
So far as the financing of the facility is concerned, the 
paper  suggested  that this might be provided  from the Fund's 
normal  resources,  including the possibility  of activating the 
General  Arrangements  to Borrow  (GAB), provided that access under 
the  facility  were within the existing  limits on annual access for 
stand-by  and extended  arrangements.  Since the Mexican precedent 
has  suggested  that a useful facility would require access much 
above those  limits, however,  it seems 
have to develop  an alternative  source 
proposal  materialize. 
likely that the Fund would 
of financing should the 
I 
9 Evaluation 
Clearly  members  of the G-24 will need to evaluate their interests 
differently  depending  on whether  or not they could expect to be 
eligible  to draw from such a facility in the next few years.  I 
shall consider  first the interests  of those countries that could 
expect  to be eligible  (see preceding  section for a list of 
these),  and subsequently  of other countries. 
.  . 
(a)  Interests  of Potential  Participants 
The dominant  consideration  for potential 
presumably  be whether  an IMF facility of 
participants  would 
the type proposed would 
work.  It would  clearly have a limited role: it could not be 
4 
expected  to save a country that has a serious balance of payments 
problem  (as Roberto  Frenkel points  out in his letter already 
discussed  in the G-24),  and indeed its availability to a country 
in that  situation  could make things worse rather than better. 
This  is because  aid is a two-edged  sword: while it can be 
enormously  valuable  in giving adjustment measures time to take 
effect,  thus mitigating  the need that would otherwise arise to 
resort  to unnecessarily  savage deflationary  actions, it can also 
provide  an unfortunate  opportunity  to delay adjustment  if it is 
provided  before  adequate measures  have been adopted.  Similarly, 
if a country  were given  access to the facility when its balance 
of payments  position  was unsustainable  and before it had 
implemented  adequate  adjustment  measures, the facility could 
simply  provide  it with  the leeway to perpetuate the unsustainable 
10 for rather  longer,  intensifying  the 
could no longer be delayed.  Thus a 
facility  to function  effectively  is 
diagnose  whether  or not the balance 
sustainable. 
Unfortunately,  as Frenkel also 
Fund's  recent  analysis  has not been 
economists  outside  the Fund were on 
.  . 
ultimate pain when adjustment 
key requirement  for the 
that the Fund be able to 
of payments position  is 
notes, it is clear that the 
up to the mark.  Many 
record as being concerned 
about  the,unsustainability  of Mexico's policies  in 1993-94, and 
, 
the threat  posed  by rising US interest rates, yet apparently  the 
IMF was complacent  about the size of the current account deficit 
that had developed;  despite an anemic growth rate, and the 
abs&ce  of any reason  for expecting  that the deficit would 
decline  substantially  without  a real devaluation.  The only 
obvious  reason  for imagining Mexico's policy stance to have been 
sustainable  was the belief that its fiscal accounts were in 
surplus  coupled  with  acceptance  of the "Lawson thesis" that 
current  account  deficits  do not matter if they are the 
counterpart  to a deficit by the private rather than the public 
/ 
sector.  But both elements  of that argument were wrong.  The 
Lawson  thesis  is erroneous  in emphasizing the public/private 
counterpart  to a deficit rather than whether  it is being used to 
finance  investment  rather than consumption.  .(Note that the 
thesis  has  failed  every time it has been advanced:  in Chile in 
1981, Britain  in 1988, and Mexico  in 1994.)  Second,  it turned 
out that Mexico  actually had a less solid fiscal position  than 
11 appeared, since public sector capital  spending  had been moved 
off-budget into the Development  Bank several  years ago when it 
was so compressed that no one noticed,  but it had grown again to 
4.1 percent of GDP by 1994,  without  the IMP objecting. 
However, rumors suggest  that the IMP has learned  from the 
Mexican debacle that current  account  deficits  do matter.  While 
any rule of prudence limiting  the size of current account 
. 
deficits judged sustainable  is bound to be 
,  would be better to have an arbitrary  limit 
GDP than to have no specific limit  at all. 
scope for making such a rule a little  more 
somewhat arbitrary, it 
of (say)  3 percent of 
There should be some 
sophisticated  than a 
flap limit applicable to all countries,  e.g. by allowing  a larger 
current account deficit where it is financed  by inflows  of direct 
investment, by allowing a higher limit  for a country  with a rapid 
underlying rate of growth, and/or by allowing  a larger  deficit 
for a country with a low stock of debt or a high level of exports 
relative to GDP.  But one should  certainly  demand that the IMP 
incorporate some reasonable limits  on current  account  deficits 
into its judgments about sustainability  before giving it the 
authority to approve automatic  access  to lines of credit  to meet 
a speculative outflow.  Unless and until a country  had adopted 
adjustment measures designed  to reduce  the deficit to the 
sustainable range, a country  with an excessive  deficit should be 
ineligible.  Mexico should not have been pre-approved  in 1994 
when its current account deficit  was unsustainable  and there were 
no policy meisures in place to reduce it. 
12 Within  the  limited range of cases for which  such a facility 
might  be relevant,  its usefulness  would depend  on the answers to 
the following  questions: 
(1)  Would  it be possible  to provide funds 
nip a crisis  in the bud? 
(2)  Would  the facility be large enough? 
fast.enough  to 
(3)  Would  the maturity  of loans be long enough to nurture 
.  . 
the reestablishment 
,  The westion  of the 
crucial.  In order to be 
be able to provide  funds 
of confidence? 
speed with which funds are provided  is 
useful,  a special facility would need to 
considerably  more rapidly than has been 
traqitional.  The  suggestion  in the IMF paper was that this could 
be accomplished  by preestablishing  at the time of an Article  IV 
consultation  access,  or potential  access, to a line of credit, 
provided  that the Fund were satisfied that the country's policies 
merited  support.  Subsequent  access to that line of credit in the 
event  of need might  be automatic  or might require  Fund approval. 
Automatic  access would clearly be an advantage  in terms of 
permitting  timely  access when market pressures  develop.  Indeed, 
in the cases that  some argue provide the only rationale  for 
creating  a new facility, where speed is crucial  if assistance  is 
to be of any use at all, automatic  access would  seem to be 
essential.  This  is because  it seems inevitable that a 
requirement  that the Fund approve a drawing on a line of credit 
would  involve  a significant  delay before a drawing were possible. 
Admittedly  there  is no very  obvious reason why IMF procedures 
13 need be as slow as they are, and the speed  with which the Fund 
moved in the Mexican case reinforces  one's doubts as to whether 
it would not be possible to do better.  Macroeconomic  management 
is by now pretty familiar intellectual  terrain.  On the other 
hand, the Managing Director's  commitment  of the Fund in advance 
of consultations with 
protests from some of 
. 
difficult to envisage  .  . 
month from the time a  , 
the Executive  Board provoked strong 
the European countries.  It would seem 
a drawing taking place in much less than 
country  recognizes  that it faces a need 
a 
unless that right is automatic.  And a delay of a month gives a 
lot of time for financial  markets to magnify a crisis. 
It will be objected  that a requirement  of prior 
8 
authorization would impose  great demands  on the Fund's analytical 
capacity to judge whether or not a countryls  policies are 
sustainable.  Had the Fund erred by giving  Mexico an automatic 
right to draw prior to 20 December 1994, it is entirely  likely 
that the crisis would have been postponed a few weeks and would 
subsequently have proved even more intractable  because  the 
inherited stock of indebtedness  would have been bigger.  In fact, 
however, the difference in analytical  requirements  is quite 
limited.  If the Fund had to make a quick decision  at the time 
that a country needed to draw, it would still need to make 
judgments about whether policies were adequate  and the balance of 
payments was sustainable:  it would simply  avoid the potential 
embarrassment of seeing a country that it had 
sound being judged by the markets to be risky 
14 
declared  to be 
without having the chance to think  again before  it provided support.  But if one 
believes  that the Fund is capable of making sound judgments, and 
leading rather  than following the markets, then it is really not 
obvious  that  it will be in a markedly better position to make 
such judgments  at the time the country needs to draw than a few 
months  before.  Provided that the country is required to provide 
key  financial  statistics  to the Fund that give assurance that its 
policy  stance  is indeed that which was endorsed at the time the 
,  line of credit was approved, the risks in automatic access ought 
/  not to be significantly  greater than those involved in a decision 
at the time a drawing  is made.  It would be a tragedy  if the 
Fun$l's  blindness  to the unsustainability  of Mexico's policies, 
which  easily  could be and hopefully  already has been remedied, 
were to preclude  the facility being designed in such a way as to 
be useful. 
The second  question  is that of the size  of the facility. 
The Mexican  experience  made  it transparently  clear that in order 
to address  this type of need the resources to be made available 
have to be much  larger than those which have traditionally  been 
provided  by the Fund, or that were envisaged by the Fund paper of 
last September.  The additional  resources that would be needed 
might  come from several sources:  from an expansion in the size of 
the Fund's regular  resources:  from an expansion in the size of 
commitments  to the GAB, and/or an increase in the number of 
countries  that  contribute  to the GAB; from an alternative GAB- 
like facility  that might be created for this specific purpose; or 
15 from a decision  to borrow in the financial markets,  as  recently 
suggested  by Lamberto  Dini.  It would make little difference to 
borrowers  as to where the funds came from, except insofar as 
potential  participants  might  be  expected to contribute relatively 
more under  some proposals  than others, with the presumption being 
that  they  would  contribute  the most if the facility were financed 
by a tailor-made  GAB-like  arrangement.  But even this would not 
be a matter  of much consequence  to them, since the borrowings 
,  would  doubtless  remain  liquid and the IMF pays market interest 
,  rates  on its borrowing  comparable  to what a country can earn by 
holding  reserves  in other forms. 
,  The final question  is that of maturity.  It has already been 
argued  that the Mexican  experience  shows that the initial Fund 
proposal  of a short-term  facility would not be very useful.  A 
longer-term  facility  could, of course, have a requirement for 
early repayment  keyed to the reflow of reserves, so that the 
average  expected  maturity might be quite short, but any facility 
that has an unconditional  requirement  of repayment in a very 
short time frame  seems unlikely  to be able to help restore 
, 
confidence  except  in the easy cases where this 
exogenous  event  (like the approval  of NAFTA in 
awaits some 
November 1993). 
(b)  Interests  of Nonparticipants 
The  interests  of countries that would not participate  in the new 
facility  involve  largely different  issues.  Of course, a facility 
that permit&d  countries that borrowed from it to ride out 
16 unjustified  speculative  pressures  would also have some spillover 
benefits  for nonparticipants,  inasmuch as avoidance of 
unnecessary  deflationary  adjustment  in those countries would help 
to maintain  higher  demand  for imports  (and thus of exports from 
other developing  countries).  But there are at least two other 
issues that  seem likely to be of greater significance to those 
_ that would  not themselves  expect to participate. 
The first  of  these  issues  is whether the new facility would  . 
,  crowd  out.other  lending activities  of the Fund.  Clearly this is 
much more  likely  if it were  financed  from the Fund's regular 
resources  than  if special  arrangements  were made to borrow from 
some other  source,  either,the  GAB, the potential participants  in 
# 
the facility  in a separate  GAB-like  arrangement,  or the market. 
This would  be of special  importance  if the maturity were much 
longer than  envisaged  by the IMF paper, which was argued above to 
be essential  if the facility  is to be effective.  Thus other 
developing  countries  would  seem to have a very clear interest in 
ensuring  that  if such a facility  comes into being it is provided 
with  its own distinctive  source of finance rather than that it 
, 
draws on the Fund's  regular 
a way that does not require 
to contribute. 
resources,  and that it be financed  in 
nonparticipating  developing countries 
The other  issue that surely  impinges on nonparticipants  is 
whether  the creation  of such a facility might provide a mechanism 
for reinvigorating  the Fund.  It is 
since the mid-1970s  it has provided 
a weakness of the Fund that 
rather little in the way of 
17 services that its major shareholders  find of any direct value: 
they have not borrowed from it, nor has there been any efffective 
Fund input into producing  mutual consistency  among their 
macroeconomic policies.  The main benefits  that they perceive 
themselves to derive from their participation  in the Fund are to 
have an institution  to deal cooperatively  with systemic  problems 
like debt and the transition and to provide a collective  . 
international response to countries that require international 
'support in order to get back on their feet.  Having the Fund meet 
a systemic need for a backstop facility  to stabilize  the process 
of investment in emergent  markets, or even  more to help fulfill 
agreed exchange rate commitments  on the part of industrial 
countries, might help maintain their support  for the institution. 
Such support would seem to be in the interest  of developing 
countries, inasmuch as they are now the borrowers  from the Fund 
and the recipients of its technical  assistance. 
The adoption of a backstop facility  might even provide an 
occasion for extending the scope of effective  surveillance  beyond 
the countries that borrow from the Fund.  This is because it 
t, 
would introduce the Fund into the business  of asking  whether its 
members' policies are sustainable  even  when they are not seeking 
to borrow immediately.  Essentially  the same  principles  that are 
needed to evaluate whether a country can safely  be given access 
to a line of credit  could be used to evaluate  the policies  of  the 
major industrial countries.  It might therefore  be a relatively 
I 
small additional step to introduce  effective  surveillance  over 
18 the countries  of major  systemic  significance, with the hope that 
might  offer  of improving  their macroeconomic  management. 
If there  is felt to be a need for backstop  finance and the 
Fund is not chosen  as the vehicle  for providing  it, one would 
assume that  the BIS or the G-7 would be called on to fulfill that 
role.  (However, the BIS has in the past provided  only bridging 
finance,  so that  its acceptance  of this role would be a major 
departure.)  In either  event developing  countries would be 
'deprived  of any input  into the determination  of how much help  is 
provided  and on what  conditions.  Individual countries that 
sought help would  have to negotiate  bilaterally with the G-7 or 
the,BIS,  neither  of which have any developing country 
participation,  such as one hopes provides a relatively 
sympathetic  environment  within the Fund. 
!Zonclusions 
The role  envisaged  for a backstop  facility of the character 
discussed  in this paper  is necessarily  limited, to cases where 
the balance  of payments  position  is sustainable but not so solid 
as to preclude  the emergence  of speculative pressures  in response 
to unexpected  developments.  This will typically mean countries 
with current  account  deficits  in the range of 1 percent to 
perhaps  4 percent  of GDP, or 'with  larger deficits but where 
remedial  adjustment  measures  have already been implemented  and 
the Fund  is satisfied  that 
declining  to'a  sustainable 
the deficit is in the course 
level.  If the facility were 
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of 
also used to provide  resources  to help defend pegged exchange rates,  it 
would  similarly  be crucial to develop and utilize techniques  for 
estimating  equilibrium  exchange rates, and avoid lending to 
defend  disequilibrium  rates.  (Given the uncertainty involved  in 
this  estimation,  this would  imply restricting support to 
countries  operating  with a wide band for their exchange rates.) 
Quite  a large number of developing countries, including many 
of the  larger  ones, might be eligible to draw on such a facility. 
Their  interest  is primarily  in judging whether such 
could work.  This depends upon the IMF learning the 
Mexican  crisis,  that  large current account deficits 
a facility 
lesson of the 
are 
preFumptively  dangerous,  and showing greater awareness of that in 
the  future than  it has done in the immediate past.  It also 
requires  that  any facility  be automatically available once a line 
of credit has been  approved,  upon the finance made available 
being  on a scale  substantially  greater than the Fund has been 
providing  in recent  years, and upon maturities being decidedly 
longer than was  envisaged  in the Fund proposals of September 
1994. 
The interests  of  the  remaining developing countries, those 
that  still have  little access to the international capital market 
and that  accordingly  are unlikely  to be candidates for drawing  on 
any such facility  for the foreseeable 
They  certainly  have  a strong interest 
facility  is developed,  it has its 
does  not lead to a squeeze on the 
20 
OWIl 
future, are different. 
in ensuring that, if such 
source of financing and 
funds available to them under 
a the Fund's  existing  facilities.  Provided that condition  is met, 
however,  it might  be advantageous  to them to have such a facility 
developed  within  the context of the Fund, since this 
to keep the IMF alive and might help to increase  its 
areas  such as surveillance  of the larger countries. 
scale  on which  such a facility would have to operate 
be effective  might  even create precedents to which  . 
nonparticipants  could subsequently  appeal in arguing 




in order to 
for larger 
However,  even if one does not take the traditional  concerns 
about moral  hazard  very seriously,2 it may seem unlikely that 
the,industrial  countries  will be willing to endorse the 
conditions  that  I have suggested would be essential  in order to 
allow  such a facility  to operate effectively.  Most problems  of 
capital  flows  can probably  be addressed through the Fund's 
existing  facilities,  and it may be judged an over-reaction  to 
create  a new  facility  to deal with the occasional  case where a 
threat  of default  could arise in the dbsence of immediate 
disbursement.  Perhaps  it would be better to think of some other 
way  of  containing  that particular  threat. 
The most  promising  alternative approach would seem to be 
that being  urged  by Jeffrey  Sachs, who has recently been 
developing  proposals  for giving the Fund a duty and a capacity  to 
respond  to debt difficulties  by operating an international 
2  What country  would deliberately risk getting itself into a 
situation  like that  in which Mexico now finds itself because of a 
belief  that  this would  entitle it to some bailout  finance? 
21 analogue to the Chapter 11 proceedings  in the U.S. bankruptcy 
code ("The  IMF and Economies in CrisisI',  mimeo).  To prevent a 
government that has decided it wants to reform being pushed into 
a vicious circle, in which the erosion  of the state's fiscal 
capacity emasculates its ability to supply  basic services  which 
in turn undermines the willingness  of the populace to respect  the 
authority of the state and pay their taxes, Sachs argues  that it 
needs the same elements as in a financial  restructuring  under 
’  Chapter 11 of the U.S. bankruptcy  code.  These involve #Ia  debt 
(  service standstill at the outset of reforms;  fresh working 
capital during restructuring,  so that critical  governmental 
fun@ions  don't collapse; and (usually)'  some debt reduction  at 
the culmination of reforms,  to help reestablish  the government's 
solvencyQ*. 
It can be argued that the IMF already  has the legal 
authority to impose a debt service standstill,  by invoking  the 
provisions of the IMFls Article VI.  The fresh  working capital 
during restructuring is already in principle  provided  by the 
Fund's lending programs (although,  Sachs  argues,  typically  on too 
,modest  a scale).  Extensive  debt reconstruction,  involving  both 
debt reduction and a stretching  of maturities,  was negotiated  for 
a number of countries under the Brady  Plan, albeit without  the 
assurance that a legal basis  'would  have  provided for enforcing 
acceptance by recalcitrant  creditors.  Thus the idea of turning 
the IMF into an agency responsible  for administering  bankruptcy- 
style proceedings where countries find  themselves  impossibly 
22 illiguid  does  not appear entirely  fanciful.  Moreover,  market 
knowledge  that  this was  likely to happen  if a country 
overborrowed  might  provide  a useful discipline  discouraging  the 
markets  from pouring  excessive  funds into emergent markets  as has 




23 -to  !*A  Yew Px~tv  for  the.  7n 
In  his speech to  the  Social  Summit  in  cqmnhagen  on  7 tich  1995, 
theManaging  Dk ector  of the MT  mentioned  study  of "the  role tke 
SDR could  play  in  putting  in  place  a last-resort  financial  sarety 
net for the world”.  A  Reutara  report  OF  21 Harch  1995 on 
forthcaning  Executive  Bokd  discussions  on increases  of XXF 
resources  etated that nCaz!dessus  has 8uggested  rssurracting  a 
Japanese proposal mede a fav  years  ago  to  sat  up  a raav  INF  loan 
.  . 
facility  pf up to $30  billion  to  help countries  facing  liquidity 
crisee",  which suggests  that  this  proposal  is being  pursued 
within  the  Fund. 
The  intellectual  antecedents  of the  idea  go muoh  furthar 
be&  than  a Japanese  proposal  of  a rew  years  ago.  In  tllm  19708 
the  then  Reseaxh  Director of the Fund,  Jacques  Polak,  pointed 
out the s~lfifcation  in the  Fuadls  operations  that  could  be 
effectuated  if  the General  Account were  to  operate  exclusivaly  in 
SDRs.  Before aat,  tha proposals  of Robert  tifffin to  reform  the 
IZJSF  80  a6  to  allov  it  to increaue liquidity  (in  Gold and  t&e 
Dollar  Crisis,  1959) had envisaged this  being  done  partly by open 
market  operations in which  the Fund  would  buy  securities  in the 
money markets  of major members and  partly  by allowing  the  Fund to 
extend loans  to  countries  that needed to borrov from it.  Earlier 
still,  the  Keynes Plan  for an  International  Clearing  Union  had 
envisaged  that bancor  would be  created  automatically  as  credits 
on the  books  of 8urplUS  countries 
their credii  lines.  So the  basio 
24 
as deficit  countries  drew on 
idea  goes  back  a long  way. 
-  .  .  . w  the  m,  nothing  could  be  aOre  natural,  or  technically 
Given  that the  world  has a fiduciary  rcse~ve  aseet  created 
activities  bY  a backstop  f  acilfty  of  the  character  discussed in 
the  main  paper.  Thfo  way 02 financing  the  facility  sight alao 
overcome  the main objection  that  was  identified  to such  a 
facility  from  the  atandpcint  of  G-24  membera,  ZlaBMly 
that it  would czovd  out  the noraml  lending  activities  of  the  IHP 
9 
by competing  for  thk  limited  pool  of  the  Rrnd'a  financial 
, 
resource6. On the contrary,  a decision  to finance  a  nev  facility 
by the  creation  of additional  SDRs  might  lead  on in  due  course  to 
a funding  of  all the  Fundks  landing  by:  SDR  creation,  with  the 
pokbility  this  vould  offer of  expansion  in  the reemurcas 
available  for other  activities.  (Of  course,  the fear  of this 
af feat  may  induce the  financially  conservative  membar8  of the 
Fund to  oppose the  proposal.) 
The  question  arise8  as to whether  the  proposal  is  uoneiatant 
with  the  FundPs 
allocating  SDRs 
reads: 
Article6  of Agreement.  The  principle  for 
that  is enuhrfned  in  Article  XVIII,  Section  2  (b), 
The  rates at which  allocationa  are  to  be  made shall  be 
expressed  as percentages  of  quotae  on  the date  of  each 
decision  to allocate...  The  percentages  shall  be  the  same for 
all  participants. 
No  alternative  basis  for  allocation  is  provided  for  in  the 
Articles.  It is therefore  cl8ar  that  a facility  of  iadeterzainate 
size  vould  not be compatible  with  Article  XVIII.  what  might  be 
legal  vould'be  to create  once-for-all  a $30  billion  facility  by 
2s 
.  . 
. having  every  member,  or all fibe  members  t!mt  would  be  elfgiblo  to 
&au,  assign  Thai?  ahare  of an allocation  to the facility. 
Olwi~u~ly  t&oer  G-24  mmbees  that  do not  expect  to draw  would 
have  an  interest  in  snsuthg  that  only  countries  that  dfd urpect 
to draw would De required  to  assign  their  sham  of the 
allocation:  under  such  a'  foramla  they  might  even  rscsive  an 
allocation  that  othemd~m  wuuld  not  happen. 
This fornulation-  recalls  the  many izgenioua  proposals  that 
have  been  advanced  Gver  the  years  for enabling 
, 
of countries  t3 rsc8ivs  new  SDR  allocations  in 
general  allocation.  The  basic  idea  has always 
countries  should pass  on their  new  allacations 
deserving  TOtIFs 
the  absence  of a 
been  that  6ome 
to  the  POUF  that 
it'vas desired  to favor. Hone of  these  proposals  haa  ever  won 
approval:  they  require  not  only  the  willingness  of 85 percent  of 
th.s Rand  voting  power  to  approve  an  allocation,  but  uamfz~~us 
consent  on  the  park  of  the  members expected  to  assign  their 
allocations. 
The  alternative  to  achieving  such 
amend  the  Fund’s  Articles,  which  is  an 
unanimity  would  be  to 
equally  daunting  task. 
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